Reading Reza Negarestani's Intelligence and Spirit #1: It only is what it does.
did you know that the mind is only what it does and the daesin of geist is language
I am part of a reading group for Reza Negarestani’s Intelligence and Spirit, and these are some of my notes from the first five sections of the first chapter.
For citations of Intelligence and Spirit, the format will be (IS, x), therein x is equal to the page in which the cited text can be in the Urbanomic edition of the book. For other books, the specific edition and book will be noted down in a footnote.
1. It only is what it does: The Functionalist Account of Mind
This book is built upon the functionalist account of mind. Negarestani’s central claim is that mind is only what it does. Quoting Hegel, the history of spirit is its own deed, and spirit is only what it does, making itself the object of its own consciousness. This links the functional perspective on mind directly to Hegel's concept of spirit. From this functionalist viewpoint, what mind does is primarily realized by the sociality of agents. This sociality, in turn, is described as being primarily and ontologically constituted by the semantic space of a public language. The book argues that mind's activity involves structuring the universe to which it belongs. This structure is presented as the very register of intelligibility as it pertains to both the world and intelligence itself. It is only in virtue of the multilayered semantic structure of language that sociality becomes a normative space of recognitive-cognitive rational agents. Within this normative space—which is described as being at once intersubjective and objective—supposedly ‘private’ experiences and thoughts are structured as experiences and thoughts. Negarestani therefore argues for a deprivatized account of mind.
This functional account attributed to the mind is described as a normative ‘rule-governed’ account, rather than a metaphysical one. The function of mind is identified as structuration, including conceptualization, rendering intelligible, and making objective. The position taken is that there are no intrinsic functions in nature; instead, all metaphysical functions are modeled on the normative activities of the mind, similar to Kant's 'as if' arguments. Functions can only be attributed to activities, which are specific, contextual, and domain-sensitive, not to things; "Mind is not a thing: it is only what it does" (IS, 10).
This section, presented as more of a preamble or rough sketch, provides an outline of this functionalist and deprivatized account of mind, or geistig intelligence, laying down premises that will be elaborated later.
A Note on Aufheben
I believe it is important to rapidly discuss Negarestani’s distinction of Hegel’s usages of the concept of aufheben/aufhebung. Negarestani uses the English word "suspension" or the verb "suspend" as a common equivalent for Aufheben or Aufhebung, preferring it over "sublation" because it captures a broader range of meanings, such as:
To lift up or to heave (heben), as if something is on or has fallen to the ground.
To pick up or actively seize something, which accentuates the previous connotation (auf-heben).
To preserve or retain something.
To cancel or abolish something, to remove or take out of action.
Hegel places emphasis on the positive and negative connotations (3 and 4). This means Aufhebung involves a process of simultaneously cancelling or abolishing something while also preserving or retaining an aspect of it. An example provided by Negarestani is the case of the pure introspective 'I'. While the immediate 'I' might seem simple and unmediated, it is, in fact, mediated by its relations with others. Through the concept of aufhebung, the positive immediacy of this self-reflexive 'I' is cancelled. However, the determinate negativity that accounts for the difference between the immediate and its mediation—the relationship between 'I' and another 'I'—is preserved. Also, Aufhebung has both a temporal and spatial aspect. What appears immediate is taken out of action or postponed—temporal aspect—only to preserve the difference between the immediate and its mediation on an elevated level—spatial aspect. This is illustrated by the suspension of Being and Nothing in the more stable Determinate Being.1 Furthermore, Aufhebung is associated with the extended labour of determinate negation, in contrast to abstract or indeterminate negation. Determinate negation is a process that takes time and differentiates the cancellation of a particular content—like the human condition or capitalism as a supposed totality—from a simple, punctual act of negation that might inadvertently perpetuate the very state it seeks to abolish.
2. Functions and Multilevel Structural Constraints
The second section of the first chapter, titled "Functions and Multilevel Structural Constraints", delves into the methodological approach used to analyze geist—mind or spirit—within the book's functionalist framework. The book aims to provide a functional description of mind, specifically geistig intelligence. This involves characterizing geist in terms of its functions. Hegel's approach to characterizing Spirit (geist) in terms of its functions and then analyzing these into distinct activities and the structures supporting them is seen as a "systematic attempt to uncover the deep functional picture of mind" (IS, 18). While drawing insights from contemporary functionalism, the approach seeks to steer clear of orthodox or metaphysical functionalism. It adopts methods used for studying complex systems, particularly those with nested hierarchical structures where different scales or levels are important.2
The deep picture of a function describes it as being organized by activities, constraints, and unities across different structural levels or scales. This view explains the function not by its appearance, but by its organization, specifying the required activities, roles, spatial/temporal organization, and dependency relations for its realization. A function is orchestrated by qualitatively different activities, each with specific constraints and associated with a distinct structural domain or level. A central aspect introduced in this section is the necessity of a multilevel approach to analyze geistig activities. This approach is crucial for analyzing the types and scales of structural constraints. These constraints can be either physical or sociocultural. The significance of these constraints is that they at once afford such activities and specify them. A proper analysis of a function in this way serves as a blueprint for the realization of that function, and its potential modification via changes in its underlying structural constraints. Functional analysis and the study of structural complexity should be approached as essentially conjoined programs. Ignoring this connection or "flattening different levels of activities" can lead to "specious descriptive and prescriptive conclusions" (IS, 17), making concepts unintelligible (like understanding capitalism as a totality). An important thought is that the systematic functional analysis of what geist does "itself turns into a function that reorganizes geist" (IS, 18). This shifts the perspective from asking what mind is to asking what mind can become. This idea is already present in Hegel's view of geist as the object or artefact of its own Concept, focusing on realizing itself according to its formal reality. The discussion of structural constraints and multilevel analysis introduced here is linked to a critique of the transcendental structure – examining what structures are necessary for mind or thinking versus the contingency of their specific types. This theme will be elaborated in later chapters.
3. Functional Integration: Phases of Geist
The third section of the first chapter introduces Hegel's picture of geist and a social model of intelligence. This picture of geist is the presentation of a social model of general intelligence. This model posits that sociality is a formal condition necessary for the realization of cognitive abilities that could not be achieved by individual agents alone. This sociality is described as a formal space, often linked to language treated not just as a communication medium, but as a semantic space where computation and logic converge. The section explicitly introduces the equation of general intelligence with geist. General intelligence is understood not just as a collection of intelligent behaviors, but as a unified intellect. Its 'generality' signifies a qualitative space encompassing all its behaviors and activities. Therefore, analogous to geist, general intelligence is characterized by three principal attributes:
Necessary abilities.
The intrinsic social frame of these abilities.
Their qualitative integration into a generative framework.
The concept of qualitative integration is also introduced in this section. It's through this integration that intelligence becomes a generative framework. This framework enables intelligence not only to recognize itself but also to inquire into and modify its conditions of realization and enablement. Realizing geist or general intelligence is framed as a problem of qualitative integration that allows for this self-recognition and modification of conditions.
Hegel's account of geist is understood as defining it not just by its activities but also by its phases of integration. Mind is constituted by the organization of its components and by passing through different unities of itself. These unities are outcomes of the principal attributes, allowing geist to recognize itself and realize itself according to this recognition. Examples of these phases include transitions from mere consciousness to self-consciousness, historical consciousness, and ultimately to absolute knowing. These phases represent different qualities of geist and a qualitative shift in the structure of general intelligence. These modes of integration and the resulting new unities are represented and established as normative models referred to as the Concept. Recognizing these models provides agents with access to the intelligibility of the structural transformation of geist. By recognizing the necessary conditions of its realization, intelligence can realize itself under a new and higher unity.
The integration of abilities and the formation of qualitative unities leads to two main outcomes: transitions in the qualitative form of geist—recognizing itself from a higher unity—and the possibility of forming a conception or formal model of this form. This conception acts as a model for agents to recognize their abilities and constraints and to act on their conditions of realization to modify or reconstitute them. This establishes a dynamic link between intelligence and intelligibility, and between the conditions for realization and the recognition of those conditions. The intelligibility of the faculties and the recognition of necessary conditions become premises for functional change and further transformation. As we’ll see, this link between conception and transformation is fundamental, characterizing self-conscious creatures and rational agents, and constitutes the history of geist.
4. Self-Relation: A Function in Progress
This is the good one. This fourth section elaborates on self-relation as a functional quality of geist in its ongoing process of realization. Self-relation is defined as a defeasible and disequilibrial constructive process. In this process, geist utilizes the intelligibility of its structural transformations—which constitute its history—as a model for conceiving itself from the standpoint of a reality that exceeds it. The positive freedom of geist, understood as the freedom to act, is an expression of this self-relation, characterized as formal autonomy. The process of self-relation begins with the seemingly trivial tautology "I am I" (I=I). However, the act of positing this tautology leads geist to realize that the accomplished individuality it perceives itself to be is, in fact, an ongoing process of individuation. This individuation occurs from the perspective of that which is not the immediate "I," namely the other I and reality in its radical otherness.
Self-relation should not be understood as a straightforward, immediate connection to the self that is taken for granted, nor as merely acknowledging oneself as a living being subject to species needs. Instead, its significance lies in its ramifications and what it does. It begins with a negation of objects and the external world, but this very act of negation brings the self-conscious subject into direct confrontation with a resisting reality that is not passive. This reality imposes constraints upon both thoughts and actions. Consequently, self-relatedness compels the subject to project outward and become conscious of a reality that is not merely an extension of the self but an external order. This interaction with a resisting reality renders the subject's thoughts defeasible—prone to revision—and its actions challengeable. Even though self-relation starts with the simple premise "I am I," its consequences are far from trivial; they exceed the initial premise. When a life form negates the outside world for its own interests, it simultaneously opens up a new perspective where reality becomes intelligible as something that does not conform to, and indeed actively resists, the life form's desires. Where reality is intelligible as an active, constraining order, self-consciousness is defined not by serving species needs or interests but by adapting to an intelligible reality that goes beyond these species-related concerns. The medium for this adaptation is the order of reason, broadly described as a system of thoughts that are essentially revisable and actions that are challengeable, enabled by the constraints imposed by reality in its otherness. Characterizing self-consciousness in terms of these necessary internal relations between thinking, action, and reality's constraints distinguishes it as a formally represented order. In this order, all thoughts and actions representing it also necessarily conform to its ordering principles. This ordering is initially seen in the formal-abstract unity of thoughts and actions and later in the formal-concrete unity of the thinking self and material reality (I and not-I, first-person and second-person thoughts). Acts of an essentially self-conscious creature fall under this formally represented order where thoughts explain or cause actions, and actions not only fall under their thoughts but also exhibit them. This ties thoughts and actions to the question of justification, asking if they reveal or justify the causality of self-conscious thoughts.
As an order that both formally represents and is represented by the causality of thought, self-consciousness functions as a unifying point or configuring factor for mind. To actualize what is only a formal self-consciousness—general I-thoughts—, geist must posit that which is not-I. It is only through the other—not-I—that the self-relation of particular I-thoughts, which seemed immediate to the subject, but were mediated from the viewpoint of the other, can become immediate again. This is actualized self-consciousness. The self-positing of mind as a unifying point is a formal condition necessary for positing and recognizing reality in its otherness. It is the configuring factor enabling the intelligible unity of mind and reality as both distinct and coextensively configured. The task is to comprehend the 'I' ontologically, beyond merely linguistic configurations or hypostatization as substance. For the intelligible unity of mind and reality—autonomy of thought and the alien thing—to be concretely realized and for self-consciousness to establish its determinate truth, it must become conscious of itself from a second-person viewpoint – that of a reality in excess of thought, yet still intelligible. The formal autonomy of thought thus requires stepping into the open and conceiving self-consciousness from the perspective of a reality wholly other to it.
Once a minimal and formal self-relation is established, it creates a gap between mind and world. Concrete self-consciousness is achieved only by bridging this gap from the other side – from what is now outside the manifest identity of the "I". This bridging is the labour of negation, which implies that there is no direct access between mind and reality, or between one I and another; contact is only possible through the effort of conception. Through the labour of negation, the formally trivial identity relation (I=I) transforms into an I*, where I* represents the self or mind viewed from the perspective of an unrestricted world or abyss that must be rendered intelligible. The intelligibility of the self-conscious mind thus depends on the intelligibility of this abyss, which is an objective striving to be achieved. Intelligence becomes genuine intelligence when it relinquishes its passivity, actively works to render reality intelligible, and in doing so, begins to re-engineer its own reality. The transition from formal self-consciousness—minimal self-relation—to concrete, experienced self-consciousness is presented by Negarestani the most fragile of endeavors, underscoring the maximal fragility in the realization of intelligence. If geist ceases to view itself from the perspective of a radically other reality or stops expanding the intelligibility of this otherness, it ceases to be geist. Actual self-consciousness is therefore not a given state but a "practical achievement" and an object of struggle. This transition from the formal autonomy of thought to a state of concrete self-consciousness is ultimately the project of freedom itself.
As we have discussed, the formal structure of self-relation as a functional quality of geist can be seen in its most minimal form as an identity relation (I=I), referred to as the "trivial curriculum" (IS, 31). However, in its unique and emancipatory configuration, it is a formal relation whose formality is the order of thought or reason. The formally posited I=I, as self-consciousness, is not a simple relation but a map that must be expanded and navigated. While the simple identity relation I=I is considered an "awkward circularity", in its formal or rational manifestation (I=I*), it becomes a functional circle that is neither vicious nor awkward. This circle closes upon itself by encompassing another I or self-consciousness, as well as the "not this-I," which is reality in its excess of otherness. By closing upon itself through the order of intelligibilities—theoretical, practical, and axiological—, self-consciousness suspends every manifest identity relation, whether of the I, the human, mind, or intelligence.
Hegel-inspired mathematical formalism
Self-consciousness cannot be described by a simple identity relation but requires the notion of I*. This map transforms I (formal self-consciousness) into I* (I or mind from the perspective of its dual, reality in its radical otherness). To establish its truth determinately, mind must strive not only to render the unrestricted world intelligible but also to expand the order of intelligibilities that constitutes reality in its excess. This excess, viewed through the lens of the intelligible, is crucial for rethinking and reinventing intelligence. Now let’s have some real fun, this structure can be represented using a Hegel-inspired mathematical formalism involving identity maps between I and I* as objects (IS, 33):
First, if we treat I and I* as objects with their respective identity maps, then I=I* is really:
This shows how the simple abstract "I" finds its truth and reality—becomes concrete, I*—not in isolation, but through its engagement with and recognition by 'reality in excess' and other self-consciousnesses, which defines its concrete freedom. This process of rendering reality intelligible and being recognized transforms the initial formal self-consciousness (I) into a realized, concrete self-consciousness (I*). Therefore, it follows that:
Let’s try to explain this. This comprehensive formula is presented as the direct logical outcome of the specified identity relationship between I and I*. While Negarestani provides the formula as a whole resulting from this definition, he does not break down how the individual components within the resulting formula, but he does cite Lawvere’s Functorial Semantics of Algebraic Theories, so let’s check that book.
f: In Lawvere's text, f is frequently used to denote a functor. A functor is a mapping between categories that preserves the structure of those categories, meaning it maps objects to objects and morphisms to morphisms in a way that respects composition and identity morphisms. Lawvere defines f as a functor from category A to category B (written as A f B).
I: It can refer to an identity mapping, indices within a set (e.g., i ∈ n), or be part of the notation for specific categories (such as S1 for the category of sets). In the context of the notation above, I was used to represent formal self-consciousness and described as the identity map of I*.
*: It is used to denote the opposite category. For a category A, A* is the opposite category where the direction of all morphisms is reversed. It might also denote a specific construction or property related to the preceding symbol. We can therefore see how this is concrete self-consciousness.
We’ve already talked about the first part of the notation, so let’s discuss the second part
First, I right-arrow{I} to I represents a morphism from the object I to the object I, named I. Within the context where I is both an object (formal self-consciousness) and defined as an identity map (of I*), this specific arrow represents the identity morphism on the object I. It signifies that formal self-consciousness maps onto itself, representing its self-identity or self-relation.
And I right-arrow{f} I* represents a morphism from the object I (formal self-consciousness) to the object I* (concrete self-consciousness), named f. Given f is often a functor, this represents a mapping or process (f) that relates or transforms formal self-consciousness into concrete self-consciousness. I* is the codomain of I (when I is considered the identity map of I*), which aligns with a mapping f going from I (as domain/source) to I* (as codomain/target).
And I* right-arrow{I*} I* represents a morphism from the object I* to the object I*, named I*. Since I* is both an object (concrete self-consciousness) and defined as an identity map (of the codomain of I), this arrow likely represents the identity morphism on the object I*. It signifies that concrete self-consciousness maps onto itself, representing its self-identity or self-relation.
Basically, formal self-consciousness (I) has an identity relationship with itself (I right-arrow{I} I), there is a mapping (f) from formal self-consciousness (I) to concrete self-consciousness (I*) (I right-arrow{f} I*), and concrete self-consciousness (I*) has an identity relationship with itself (I* right-arrow{I*} I*). These three relationships are stated to hold simultaneously (\land).
So let’s discuss the last part.
fI*: In mathematical notation, particularly in category theory, juxtaposition of symbols often indicates composition of morphisms or functors. Given that f is a morphism from I to I*, and I* is defined as the identity map on I*, the term fI* is interpreted as the composition I* ∘ f. This is a map that first applies f (from I to I*) and then applies the identity map I* (from I* to I*). The result of this composition is a map from I to I*.
Therefore, the equality f = fI* (meaning f = I* ∘ f) states that the mapping f from formal self-consciousness (I) to concrete self-consciousness (I*) is equal to the composition of f followed by the identity map on concrete self-consciousness (I*). This equality reflects a fundamental property of identity morphisms in category theory: composing any morphism f: A \to B with the identity morphism id_B on its codomain B results in the original morphism f (i.e., id_B ∘ f = f). Since I* is specifically defined as the identity map on the codomain of f (which is I*) within Negarestani’s formalization of Hegel, the statement f = I* ∘ f is a direct consequence of this definition.
The full formula If = f = fI* (or I ∘ f = f = I* ∘ f) includes another equality, If = f. Based on the definition of I as the identity map of I* and f mapping from I to I*, the term If is interpreted as the composition I ∘ f. Here, I is the identity map on the domain of f (which is I). The equality I ∘ f = f states that composing the identity map on I with f results in f. This is the dual identity property: f ∘ id_A = f for a map f: A \to B.
Thus, the entire expression If = f = fI* asserts simultaneously that composing the identity map on the domain of f (I) with f yields f (I ∘ f = f), and composing f with the identity map on the codomain of f (I*) also yields f (f = I* ∘ f). This highlights the roles of I and I* as identity transformations within this system, acting as the neutral elements for composition with f from either the domain or codomain side. These are fundamental properties expected of identity maps in any category, applied here to the specific objects I and I* and the morphism f that links them in this formalization of self-consciousness.
To summarize all of this, the notation means that the existence of a map f from formal self-consciousness (I) to concrete self-consciousness (I*) implies that I and I* are, respectively, the identity maps on themselves, and consequently, composing f with the identity on its domain (I) or the identity on its codomain (I*) leaves f unchanged. This shows the structural role of I and I* as identity elements within this specific mathematical model of self-consciousness.
To return to our previous discussion of self-relation, self-relatedness, even in its minimal form (I=I), is already I=I* in its rational order. General I-thoughts do not belong to a single individual (the monadic I) but to an order where one self-conscious individual relates to another through a formal space, which is fundamentally a deprivatized semantic space or language—the dasein of geist. An individual is an "I," a minded creature conscious of itself, only by being part of this public semantic space and being recognized by another minding "I" through this space. Private thoughts are structured only insofar as they are bound up in this intersubjective and objective normative space. They are modeled on a public language. Consciousness of oneself as minded arises from being recognized by another minded and minding I. This recognitive system, built on an interactive semantic space, constitutes the order of self-consciousness. Personhood emerges from the impersonality of reason, and consciousness of the individuated self is an artifact of an individuating recognitive space that incorporates all selves. There is no consciousness without self-consciousness, and no individual cerebral "Is" without mind as a collective geist. This formal sociality of mind is a necessary condition for achieving concrete self-consciousness, though it is not a sufficient one. Real self-consciousness is a process mediated historically and socially to make this formal truth concrete. The initial stage involves recognizing and augmenting formal self-consciousness (reason), whose linguistic and logical space serves as the infrastructure of cognition.
5. Self-Consciousness as Conception and Transformation in An Objective World
This section follows the previous discussions in Chapter 1 about the functional account of self-consciousness not as a static property or internal introspection, but as a dynamic process of conception and transformation. Within Negarestani's functionalist framework for mind or geistig intelligence, self-consciousness is understood as mind being the object of its own concept, engaging in a project of determination and construction.
The section posits that logical self-relatedness is the principal function of general intelligence. This function involves recognizing and acting upon the objective intelligibility of the conditions necessary for its own realization. Exhibiting this formal self-relation means that intelligence does not treat itself as a given entity or a monad closed in on itself (which would be a trivial identity relation). Instead, it treats its history as something that negates what is immediately given to it, viewing this givenness as "only appearance and accidentality" (IS, 35, quoting Science of Logic). The project of achieving freedom—or concrete self-consciousness—commences when geist renounces its immediate givenness to itself. Instead, it begins to understand itself under a concept of itself—essentially, what it takes or conceives itself to be. This self-conception, where geist treats itself as the object of its own Concept, offers a potential path to freedom but also risks leading to 'great tragedies and grand delusions' by relapsing into givenness. Geist must choose this path of self-conception to avoid becoming merely a windowless monad.
Self-relation—as the formal condition of self-consciousness—starts with a disunified self that is simultaneously 'I' and 'not-I' (another self). This 'epistemically schizophrenic' (IS, 37) or alienated self is not a hindrance but an enabling condition for self-consciousness as a task. When the self becomes the object of its own understanding, it gains the opportunity to grasp itself through the conceptually mediated presence of other selves and as an object within an intelligible reality. Concrete self-consciousness expands as the self's relation to itself can change in the presence of other subjects. This process involves grasping self-consciousness through the exploration of conditions for object-intentionality. The shift toward objects does not abolish self-consciousness but elevates its level. The ultimate phase is seen as the self-consciousness of the Absolute, where self-consciousness secures its intelligibility within an unrestricted universe. This task involves the critique and progressive suspension of local and accidental aspects of transcendental subjectivity, moving away from simpler forms of consciousness and self-consciousness. Reinventing the subject by exploring object-intentionality is understood as a thoroughgoing process of naturalization. However, a genuine program of naturalization is not limited to explaining self-consciousness via material reality; it must also account for a concept of nature that accommodates transcendental philosophy, the distinction between thinking and being, and the autonomy of reason. This program should facilitate the unification of consciousness in knowledge of sensible objects (gegenstand) and self-consciousness in knowledge of the self qua object of thought (objekt).3 It must allow for both empirical and nonempirical claims and is a universal method, not exclusive to empirical sciences. This framework cannot rely on pre-transcendental or prescientific concepts of mind or nature.
The transformation of self-consciousness implies that the subject's relation to the self is fundamentally altered by its relation to the world; it is 'naturalized'. Consequently, the transcendental conditions of experience and the subject's transcendental structures, which set the limits of experience, must undergo transformation. Simple, egocentric self-consciousness can only entrench itself by objectifying or negating others, including itself as an object. Suspending this egocentric form requires a renewed relationship with the world in its full objectivity, allowing for a reality that actively negates back. This demands an expansion of the transcendental subject's field of experience, involving intersubjectivity and objectivity. Since the scope for expanding experience is limited by the subject's existing transcendental structures, the concrete movement of self-consciousness and the suspension of the egocentric framework require critical reflection on the possibility of varying and modifying these transcendental structures. This leads to a concrete transformation of the local transcendental subject. There can be no concrete movement of self-consciousness or expanded relationships without a methodical transformation of the transcendental subject's structure itself.
Critical self-conception and self-transformation in the objective world are undertakings whose success is not guaranteed solely by the existence of the transcendental subject. There is a gap between the conditions enabling the thinking 'I' and those sufficient for the real movement of thought. This gap can be bridged by critical reflection on the conditions of possibility of the thinking self. However, this reflection must go beyond mere analysis and comparison of concepts—transcendental reflection—because transcendental reflection operates within the limits set by the very structures being examined. Critical reflection must be supplemented with critique as a practical construction and reflection as Hegelian speculation – a movement toward the objective and suspension of the immediately given. Critical reflection on the conditions of possibility of having mind involves understanding these conditions and the construction, revision, or modification of such conditions by suspending their immediate appearance as necessary or universal. This underlies the claim that the concept of mind is not immediately present or fully grasped. Limiting reflection to transcendental analysis risks mistaking accidental, local characteristics for essential, universal ones. Genuine critique happens when reflection suspends immediate appearances and treats necessity/universality as something to be determined and constructed.
Therefore, mind as both the subject and object of critical reflection is understood as a project of determination and construction, not a given object. Critical reflection focuses on what mind does, rather than what it is—its capacity to construct, modify, and shape itself according to its essential function. From a Hegelian perspective, mind constructs itself according to its Concept and develops into a concrete reality, the Idea of mind, which is self-knowledge beyond immediate appearances. The Concept is the blueprint or seed, while the Idea is the fully realized, actualized Concept, integrating Concept and objectivity in reality. The Idea of mind is the construction of the concept within intelligible objective reality and integrates epistemological, ontological, logical, empirical, and practical aspects of mind. Consciousness requires a sensible object (gegenstand). Concrete self-consciousness is realized when consciousness becomes the object (objekt) of its own concept. This object (objekt) is an artefact of the concept, a constructible object of determinate thought. The process of determining the meaning of mind is the coordination of mind as the object of its own concept with mind as the critical subject of conception. The Idea of mind captures this coordination, constructing mind as the object of more adequate concepts that show higher unity between concept identity and objective reality. Negarestani is essentially arguing that knowledge of mind is not knowledge of a given empirical object (gegenstand) but knowledge of an object under construction according to its concept (objekt). It is knowledge based on mind's logical function as a configuring factor in the world. The Concept of mind contains both this logical function and empirical facts about its properties. It begins as the realized concept of the human mind, a mix of perceived logical function and physical properties. Negarestani’s focus is on the conditions necessary for realizing the Concept of mind as an embodied logical function structuring the world.
6. A Series of Transformations
This short section focuses on how geistig intelligence interacts with itself and the objective world through a series of self-transformations and self-conceptions.
The first contact intelligence has with the objective intelligible world is its encounter with its own underlying structure. By rendering this underlying structure intelligible, geistig intelligence can intervene in its own structure. This intervention enables geistig intelligence not only to transform itself but also to achieve a conception of itself that is not limited to immediate appearances or a given totality. Negarestani posits a necessary link: adequate self-conception leads to the enabling of self-transformation, and conversely, concrete self-transformation opens the path to objective self-conception.
Geist's self-referential activity is characterized as a constructive process and should be regarded strictly as a transformation, rather than merely a relation. The role of formal self-relation is to establish the intelligibility of geist as something capable of constituting its own transformation or having a history rather than just a nature. The articulation of this intelligibility is, in reality, equivalent to the transformation of geist, and vice versa. By pointing to itself as a unifying or configuring factor, geist acts on itself, thereby navigating the space of its concept and changing its configuration. The history of geist—which is the history of intelligence—is described as a sequence of self-transformations according to its own concept, a concept open to revision. This sequence or history is presented as an atemporal series of transformations. To become conscious of itself beyond a given identity, geist must first render intelligible its own underlying structure and conditions of realization. It is only by acting on the objective intelligibility of these conditions that geist can reconstitute or realize itself according to its concept.
This formal self-referential act doesn't imply an immediate relation or privileged access; rather, to maintain intelligibility, geist must adapt to and act on a new order of intelligibility beyond appearances and the given. This includes the nonmanifest order as excavated by the modern sciences.Self-reference or self-recognition through this new order of intelligibility engenders a different form of transformation and signals a new phase for geist.
Overall Summary
Now, I will give an overall summary of the points discussed throughout these first six sections of the first chapter of Intelligence and Spirit.
Mind is only what it does; what it primarily does it to structure the world to which it belongs; which constitutes the register of intelligibity; therefore mind becomes an artefact or object of its own conception by conceiving itself as the configurative consciousness of itself in the world.
The function of mind is first and foremost realized by the sociality of agents, which is ontologically constituted by the semantic space of a public language. Language's multilayered semantic structure turns sociality into a normative space for rational agents.
Adequate functionalism needs to consider a plurality of constituents and their organized unities with distinct structural constraints. This approach differentiates functions proper—logico-linguistic roles—from causal-structural mechanisms and avoids a flat picture of function that lacks organizing constraints.
General intelligence—equivalent to geist—is characterized by necessary abilities, an intrinsic social frame, and their qualitative integration into a generative framework. This qualitative integration leads to qualitative shifts, defining different phases of geist. These integrations establish a dynamic link between intelligence and intelligibility.
Self-relation is the formal condition of intelligence. When imbued with the negativity of reason, it becomes an engine of freedom, rooted in the essential correspondence between intelligence and the intelligible. This self-relation, in its formal or rational manifestation (I=I*), is a functional circle that expands and navigates the space of intelligibilities—theoretical, practical, axiological—, thereby suspending given or manifest identities.
Geist's self-referential activity is a constructive process, understood strictly as a transformation rather than merely a relation. The articulation of geist's intelligibility is equivalent to its transformation. By acting on itself as a configuring factor, geist navigates its concept and changes its configuration.
To become conscious of itself beyond a given identity, geist must make its underlying structure and conditions of realization intelligible. Realization according to its concept happens by acting on the objective intelligibility of these conditions. This involves adapting to and acting on a new order of intelligibility beyond appearances, including the nonmanifest order revealed by modern sciences. This engagement signals a new phase and a different form of transformation for geist.
In The Science of Logic, Hegel essentially argues that the starting point is Pure Being, defined as being without further determination. It is indeterminate, immediate, and has no difference within it or outwardly. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness, where nothing can be intuited or thought. And pure nothingness is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, complete absence of determination and content; lack of all distinction within (SL, 59. In the Cambridge edition). Because they are both pure indeterminacy, Pure Being and Pure Nothing are the same. Their difference is "completely empty," "unsayable," and depends on intention (SL, 68); they’re empty abstractions. The truth of Pure Being and Pure Nothing is neither one alone, but their identity and difference in movement. This movement is Becoming. Becoming is the process where Being "has passed over" into nothing and nothing "has passed over" into being. It is the "movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other" (SL, 60). Becoming is the "unseparatedness" of Being and Nothing; it is their "determinate unity" (SL, 80). Being and Nothing have no subsistence on their own; they subsist only in Becoming (SL, 69). In Becoming, they are present as distinct, but their distinction has just as immediately dissolved itself. Becoming, being this unrest and movement of vanishing, "collapses into a quiescent result". This result is a "vanishedness, but it is not nothing"; it is the "unity of being and nothing that has become quiescent simplicity" (SL, 81). This quiescent result is Existence (Dasein). In this unity, Being and Nothing are now only moments. They’re still distinguished but at the same time sublated. Being and Nothing, in their truth—their unity in Existence—, "have vanished as such determinations and are now something else". In Existence, they are moments but "differently determined". Their original abstract meaning no longer surfaces from this unity (SL, 82). Existence (Dasein) is characterized as "determinate being". It is Being with negation or determinateness. The term Dasein itself implies "being (Sein) in a certain place (da)" (SL, 83). Sublation (Aufhebung) here means that Being and Nothing are both negated—they no longer exist as purely indeterminate, separate abstractions—and preserved—they are integrated as constituent moments—within the determinate unity of Dasein.
As discussed in the Complexity and Computation: An Introduction to Measures, Paradigms and Programs seminar, hierarchies in complex systems possess specific characteristics, including nestedness. Nestedness is part of the concept of embedding. Living systems, for example, are described as being deeply organized and having nested hierarchies. Biological complexity involves different levels of structures highly nested into one another, such as the levels of DNA, cells, organs, and hormonal pathways. Nested organization and hierarchy help differentiate the concept from simpler, intuitive ideas of vertical hierarchies. The logic of nested hierarchies is a distinctive feature of complex systems.
Negarestani follows the Kantian distinction gegenstand and objekt. In the context of Kant, Gegenstand typically denotes a sensible object, an object of appearances or experience. It is the result of the interplay between concepts and intuition. The term Gegenstand carries connotations of "that which stands in front of me" (phenomenal manifestation), "that which is opposed to me" (versus the subject), and "that which stands or lasts" as a product of the faculties of imagination and understanding (perceptual persistence) (IS, 19). A Gegenstand thus adheres to the limits of understanding and intuition. These are ordinary sensible objects of experience or appearances, items in the world that manifest in perspectival terms and according to perceptual invariances. Objekt, on the other hand, is defined as an object explicitly for knowledge or thought. It is expressed by the determinate relation of given representations to an object (Objekt), within the concept of which the manifold of intuitions are integrated and united. The term Objekt can be associated with the Latin objectivum, which simultaneously implies the real and the ideal, being and structure. It is the kind of "object" required for the rudimentary organization of an encountered item (Gegenstand) in the world. For clarity, Negarestani uses Gegenstände for ordinary sensible objects of experience and reserving Objekt for Hegel's sense of Gegenstand.
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